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LIABILITY OF ADVERTISING ENDORSERS TO THIRD PARTIES
FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
A recurring problem throughout the law of both torts and contracts
is the troublesome question of liability to third parties. The problem
usually arises by the defendants having breached a duty of care toward the
plaintiff, such duty often being implied either through contract or through
a relationship voluntarily assumed by the defendant. One of the areas
which has been the most perplexing to courts is the question of liability
to third parties for negligent misrepresentation. Perhaps the most trouble-
some of the policy questions concerning the courts in this area is the fear
of nearly unlimited liability to a potentially unlimited number of plain-
tiffs. In general, this fear has weighed heavily in favor of defendants
when the misrepresentation was merely negligent and the plaintiff was a
third party to whom the defendant did not know the information would
be communicated.1
The leading case dealing with the problem is Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.2 In this case the defendant accounting firm certified an errone-
ously audited balance sheet. Though the defendants had no knowledge
that the sheet would be relied on by the plaintiff, they knew it was to
be used generally as the basis for financial dealings.8 The plaintiff relied
on the inaccurate balance sheet to his detriment by making several loans
and thereafter brought an action sounding in tort against the accounting
firm. Because there had been no contemplation of reliance by the par-
ticular plaintiff, the court denied any recovery based on negligent mis-
representation.4 Justice Cardozo, speaking for the court, expressed reluc-
tance to render a decision which might expose defendants "to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class." 5 The court also felt that "[t]he hazards of a business conducted on
these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not
exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to those consequences. '"'
The defendants were held liable in deceit, however, since they were found
to have acted "without information leading to a sincere or genuine be-
lief . . . that the balance sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the
business." 7
1 See Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905 (1924); Landell v. Lybrand,
264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919); Howell v. Betts 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W. 2d 924 (1962).
2255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
3 Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
- Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
5Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
Old. at 179-180, 174 N.E. at 444.
7 Id. at 193, 174 N.E. at 449-50. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 714 (3d ed. 1964),
quotes Lord Herschell, who says that for a successful deceit action, there must be proof "that
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As is apparent from the Ultramares case, third party liability in deceit
actions is somewhat broader than in negligent misrepresentation actions,8
though in neither case is the law by any means settled.' Some of the
older cases might have rejected the court's theory of liability for deceit in
Ultramares by holding that a defendant is only liable to those whom he
intends to influence and not to anyone who may subsequently rely on the
deceitful misrepresentation. ° The tendency in the more modern cases of
deceit, however, is to extend liability to those persons whom the defendant
had good reason to anticipate would be influenced or would rely on his
misrepresentation." As indicated in Ultramares, however, courts usually
find no liability against defendants who were merely negligent and who
had merely a reasonable anticipation that their misrepresentation would be
used to influence third parties.'" Generally, courts have required that the
representation be made directly to the plaintiff or to someone who the
defendant knows will use it to influence a particular person. 13 Though
there are certainly policy questions about denying recovery to third parties
for negligent misrepresentation, and though, as Prosser says, "there is a
little that looks in the direction of a broader liability,"'14 courts have con-
tinued to be reluctant to extend liability to an unknown spectrum of
plaintiffs for negligence alone.
Not all courts have been so reluctant, however. Recently, a court of
appeals in California refused to follow the line of decisions resulting from
Ultramares and in so doing, extended liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tion to perhaps its broadest reach yet. In Hanberry v. Hearst Corpora-
tion,'5 the plaintiff Hanberry had purchased a pair of shoes which had
received the "'Good Housekeeping Consumers' Guaranty Seal," the suc-
cessor to Good Housekeeping Magazine's "Seal of Approval." The seal,
which can only be applied to goods advertised in Good Housekeeping
Magazine,'6 reads, "We satisfy ourselves that products advertised in Good
Housekeeping are good ones and that the advertising claims made for
a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or
(3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false."
8 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 721 (3d ed. 1964).
9 See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 713, Section 102 (3d ed. 1964).
10 McCracken v. West, 17 Ohio 16 (1848); Greenville Nat. Bank v. National Hardwood
Co., 241 Mich. 524,217 N.W. 786 (1928).
11 See e.g., Southern States Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cromartie, 181 Ala. 295, 61 So. 907
(1913); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Newton, 130 Conn. 37,31 A.2d 462 (1943).
12 See e.g., National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 fIl. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924); Thomas
v. GuarantyTitle & Trust Co., 81 Ohio St. 432,91 N.E. 183 (1910).
13See e.g. International Products Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927);
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
14 W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 723 (3d ed. 1964).
15 276 A.C.A. 820,81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Ct. App. 1969).
161d. at 824, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
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them are truthful,"'17 and "If the product or performance is defective, Good
Housekeeping guarantees replacement or refund to consumer."' 8  The
seal appears on articles as advertised in the magazine and may also appear
on the packaging and other advertising of the goods.'9
The plaintiff alleged that she had read Good Housekeeping Maga-
zine and "believed the products bearing the seal had been examined,
tested, and inspected by [Good Housekeeping] and were good and safe
for the use intended."20  She also alleged that she had seen the shoes
she purchased advertised with the Good Housekeeping seal and that she
had relied upon the representation and purchased the shoes because of it.2
She further alleged that the shoes were defective in design and manufac-
ture, causing them to be slippery when worn on vinyl floor covering, as a
result of which she slipped and fell on a vinyl floor and "sustained severe
personal injuries."22
The plaintiff attempted to assert a cause of action against Hearst Cor-
poration -3 (which publishes Good Housekeeping) on several theories,24
one of which was negligent misrepresentation. She alleged that defendant
Hearst either made no test of the shoes, or if it did, that the test was so
negligently and carelessly carried out that the issuance of the seal was not
warranted by the information which Hearst Corporation possessed .2  The
trial court sustained Hearst's demurrer that no cause of action existed, and
dismissed the action as to Hearst. On appeal the judgment was reversed,
the court holding that the facts pleaded stated a cause of action as to
Hearst.20 The court held that implicit in the seal was a representation
by the defendant that it "has taken reasonable steps to make an independ-
ent examination of the product endorsed, with some degree of expertise
and found it satisfactory. '27  Since the purpose of the seal was to make
products more attractive to consumers, it was therefore forseeable by Hearst
Corporation that certain consumers would rely on the representation. 8
In voluntarily lending its reputation to the products advertised,
17 1d. at 822, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
18Id.
19 Id. at 824, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
2OId. at 823, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
21 Id.
22Id. at 822, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
2 3 The defendant also asserted a cause of action against both the importer-distributor and
the retailer of the shoes. Both answered the complaint and were not parties to this appeal.
See Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. 276 A.C.A. 820, 822, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 520-21 (1969).
2 4 Appellant also attempted to recover on the basis of an alleged conspiracy between
Hearst and the other named defendants and on the basis of express or implied warranty. Han-
berry v. Hearst Corporation, 276 A.C.A. 820, 823, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1969).
2 5 Hanberry v. Hearst Corporation, 276 A.C.A. 820, 823, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App.
1969).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 824, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
28 Id.
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Hearst had placed itself in the position where public policy imposes upon
it the duty to use ordinary care in the issuance of its seal. . so that mem-
bers of the consuming public who rely on its endorsement are not unrea-
sonably exposed to the risk of harm.2 9
The court also held that the lack of privity between plaintiff and
defendant was no defense to the action.30 The court summarily denied any
defenses based on the claims that the seal itself limited its liability to
replacement or refund of the purchase price31 and that the seal represented
only an opinion of the defendant3 2 The former was dismissed by holding
that while contractual obligations may be limited, tort liability cannot be
so limited.3' The latter defense was disposed of by saying that the de-
fendant held itself out to have superior knowledge of the product and
thus may be liable for negligent misrepresentation of either fact or opin-
ion.34
In announcing its decision, the court admitted that it was "influ-
enced more by public policy than by whether such cause of action can be
comfortably fitted into one of the law's traditional categories of liabil-
ity."" Such an approach was certainly necessary to support the court's
holding since no similar case has apparently ever been reported. In
addition, such a decision is obviously not in accord with the prevailing
theory of denying recovery to an unidentified plaintiff or class of plain-
tiffs.3" There are, however, at least some cases which approach the solu-
tion to the problem at issue in Hanberry. Two such cases are Walter v.
Ashton 7 and Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co. 88  In the Ashton
case, the defendant had advertised a bicycle, calling it "The Times Cycle."
The advertising material was similar in form and appearance to that of
products actually endorsed by The Times. The court granted an injunc-
tion because there was "a reasonable probability of The Times being ex-
posed to litigation . . .had they not taken the steps to disconnect their
names from the advertisements . ...-" The Edison case turns on a quite
similar fact pattern. The defendants had marketed a medicinal preparation
carrying a fictitious endorsement by Thomas Edison. The court, after
29I d.
30 Id. at 824-825, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522.




35Id. at 823, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
8 6 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) and discussion
of third party liability supra at notes 2-7.
s7 [1902] 2 Ch. 282.
88 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907).
3 9 Walter v. Ashton, [1902] 2 Ch. 282, 295.
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discussing the Ashton case,40 granted an injunction saying that Edison
was
clearly entitled to an injunction to restrain the unauthorized use of his
name, his picture, and his certificate. The possibility of injury, because
of their use without apparent objection on Mr. Edison's part, is quite as
great as it would have been in the 'Times' case had Mr. Walter stood by
and allowed the advertisement of the bicycle with what seemed to be a
'Times' endorsement.41
There was, of course, no problem of present liability to third parties
in either of these cases as there was in Hanberry. The important thing,
however, is the court's apparent recognition of the existence of potential
liability. By granting an injunction against the unauthorized use of an
advertising endorsement, each court seems to have realized, as long as
sixty years ago, that liability could be thrust upon an endorser who had
lent his name to a defective product.
Except for the Hanberry case, however, little else appears to have hap-
pened in the development of liability against advertising endorsers in the
sixty-odd years since the Edison and Ashton cases. Though some specula-
tion as to the consequences of such an action has appeared,4" Hanberry
appears to be the first case expressly recognizing a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation against advertising endorsers. There have
been many actions advanced on similar theories, 43 however, some of which
have turned on the lack of privity between the parties. One such case in
which a plaintiff unsuccessfully urged a misrepresentation cause of action
against a defendant who had negligently published a false report is laillet
v. Cashman," the famous case in which Dow Jones erroneously published
a report on its stock ticker that a Supreme Court decision had held stock
dividends taxable. The plaintiff sold short because of the report and
subsequently brought an action against the defendant for his damages.
The lower court opinion,45 subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals,
sustained defendant's demurrer saying that:
The relation of the defendant association to the public is the same as that
of a publisher of a newspaper and its duties and obligations are to be
measured by the same standards .... There is a moral obligation upon
everyone to say nothing that is not true, but the law does not attempt to
impose liability for a violation of that duty unless it constitutes a breach of
.contract obligation or trust, or amounts to a deceit, libel, or slander.40
40 Edison v. Edison Polyform and Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 140, 67 A. 392, 393-94
(1907).
41Id. at 143, 67 A. at 395.
42 See Liability of Advertising Endorsers, 2 STAN. L .RIe. 496 (1950).
4 3 See generally Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Parties, 19 VAND. L REv. 231
(1966).
44 Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N.Y. 511,139 N.E. 714 (1923).
45 Jailletv. Cashman, 115 Misc 383, 189 N.Y.S. 743, (1921).
46 Id. at 384, 189 N.Y.S. 743 at 744.
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The court of appeals affirmed saying that there was no liability for an
unintentional mistake in the absence of a contractual or fiduciary rela-
tionship.4 7
A case holding privity not necessary to the maintenance of an action
is Biakanja v. I'ving.48  The defendant there was a notary who had
negligently failed to have a will properly attested. The will then being
ineffective, the sole beneficiary under it brought an action against the
defendant claiming that she received only one-eighth of what she would
have gotten had the will been valid. The court rejected defendant's lack
of privity defense,4 though it recognized that some prior cases had de-
feated actions on such a ground.50 In rejecting defendant's appeal and
allowing recovery despite a lack of privity, the court said that "defend-
ant must have been aware from the terms of the will that, if faulty solem-
nization caused the will to be invalid, plaintiff would suffer the loss
which occurred."'" The crux of the decision, of course, is the court's
holding that the defendant is under a duty to exercise due care toward a
plaintiff regardless of a lack of contractual or fiduciary relationship with
him.
The Hanberry decision relies, in part, on Biakanja, "52 though the prob-
lem is really quite different. In Biakanja, although the plaintiff had no
contact with the defendant, the defendant could reasonably have antici-
pated harm to the plaintiff should he negligently prepare an invalid will.
The probable person to suffer harm from defendant's negligent action
can hardly be called indefinite since he was preparing a will naming
plaintiff as sole beneficiary and could reasonably anticipate harm to her
should he act negligently. The situation in Hanberry is different. There
was no readily identifiable individual whom Hearst could anticipate would
suffer harm by its negligence. Rather, if Hearst was negligent, the harm
would fall upon what Justice Cardozo believed to be an "indeterminate
class."'53 This being so, it would seem that the Hanberry case should be
decided in accordance with laillet rather than Biakanja. Even though
Hearst had a moral obligation to make truthful representation, it would
not necessarily follow that liability would be thrust upon it for breach of
that obligation."
The easy explanation for the court's decision, of course, is that Jailett
is a New York case which a California court of appeals has no obliga-
47 Jailletv. Cashman, 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923).
48 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1968).
49ld. at 651, 320 P.2d at 19.
5o Id. at 648-50, 320 P.2d at 18.
51 Biakanjav. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647,650,320 P.2d 16,19 (1958).
52 See Hanberry v. Hearst, 276 A.C.A. 820, 825, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 519, 522-23 (1969).
53 See Ultramares v. Touche, supra note 5.
54 See Ultramares v. Touche, supra note 47.
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tion to follow. Also, the lack of privity defense is crumbling considerably
as noted in Biakana." The best answer, however, and the real reason for
the decision is the court's willingness to extend the liability for negligent
misrepresentation beyond traditional boundaries. Even in the absence of a
case like Biakanja the court would have reached the same decision. This
is obvious from the court's statement that the allowance of a cause of ac-
tion is based more on grounds of public policy than upon traditional cate-
gories of liabilityY Such a contention certainly has some merit. "Im-
posing a duty of care upon the endorser would simply be a recognition
of the substantial part he plays in the producer-to-consumer chain where a
duty of care already exists. ' '57 In certifying the product for its own eco-
nomic gain, Hearst is certainly aware that at least some people will rely
on its endorsement. It may well be that this realization, along with public
policy considerations, implies a duty to use reasonable care toward the ulti-
mate consumer regardless of his identity. Allowing such a cause of ac-
tion probably will have the beneficial effect of encouraging advertising
endorsers to take much greater care before giving a product a"'Consumer's
Guaranty Seal."
The decision, however, may raise more questions than it answers. It
is admittedly advisable to impose liability with respect to third parties in
some cases of negligent misrepresentation,"' and in recognition of this, the
doctrine of Ultramares v. Touche' 9 has been gradually eroded by the courts
for some time.00 The Hanberry case, however, erodes away a significant
chunk without indicating any limits of liability. Certainly the courts
must draw the line somewhere. Justice Cardozo's fear of liability "in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class"01 is also a significant policy consideration. The Hanberry case
seems apt for a denial of liability on those grounds. The time during
which Hearst could remain liable and the number of plaintiffs who
G At 49 Cal. 2d 649, the court, after indicating the strict requirement of privity in earlier
years says that "since that time the rule has been greatly liberalized, and the courts have per-
mitted a plaintiff not in privity to recover damages in many situations for the negligent per-
formance of a contract." At 49 Cal. 2d 650, the court, citing Prosser indicates the considera-
tions present when deciding whether or not to find liability in the absence of privity:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a
third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
56 See Ultramare v. Touche, supra note 36.
67 Liability of Advertising Endorsers, 2 STAN. L. REV. 496,508 (1950).
58 Sea generally Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Parties, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231
(1966).
59 See Ultramares v. Touche, supra note 2.
c0 See W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 723-24 (3d ed. 1964).
01 See Ultramares v. Touche, supra, note 5.
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might ultimately bring actions for one instance of negligent certification
staggers the mind. Even granting the fact that Hearst certified the prod-
uct for an economic consideration is not a sufficient basis for allowing
an action against them. Were the action in deceit for an intentional mis-
representation the answer might be different,' but the Hanberry decision
could subject Hearst to gigantic liability for a negligent but innocent
misrepresentation. Allowance of such an action would leave Hearst with
no better way to protect itself from almost unlimited liability than to
discontinue making endorsements. Such a course of action is not a rea-
sonable alternative. Endorsements in varying form are a very real part
of advertising and it is certainly open to question whether anyone puts
much faith in a movie star's assurance that Brand X Dog Food really
tastes better.68 One might effectively argue that such endorsements are
merely attractive ways of marketing a product and that someone could not
reasonably believe that the endorser knows anything at all about dog
food. If this is true, the curtailment of such endorsements because of
potential liability to one who claims to have relied on the endorser's
knowledge seems to be a totally ineffective public policy argument. Even
if plaintiffs could only seldom prove reliance, endorsers might be sub-
jected to a barrage of lawsuits to protect an interest which simply does not
exist. It is foolish to say that public policy should protect a plaintiff from
a representation which he knows is merely an advertising "gimmick,"
tantamount to "puffing."
Some of these problems, of course, have never arisen and perhaps
never will. Those that have, have generally been decided under some
branch of the Ultramares rationale. As indicated above, the Hanberry case
represents a radical departure from that doctrine. It should be pointed
out, of course, that Hanberry may well be justified since Mrs. Hanberry
is seeking to recover for a personal injury rather than an economic loss.
Traditionally, courts have been more willing to find third party liability
for misrepresentation in cases of personal rather than pecuniary loss. 4
The Hanberry court does not expressly indicate this as the basis for its
decision, however. Conceivably, then, the court intends to hold that a
cause of action accrues against an advertising endorser regardless of the
kind of injury sustained. It is precisely this situation which courts have
generally attempted to avoid. It remains to be seen whether this decision
will encourage other courts to lower their boundaries on negligent misrep-
resentation actions. The public policy considerations may be sound, at
o2 As indicated earlier in the Ultra'ares case, supra, note 2, a broader standard of lia-
bility has been found for intentional rather than negligent misrepresentation.
63 This of course underlines the problem which Mrs. Hanberry may have in convinc-
ing a court that she bought the shoes because of the Good Housekeeping seal, as she al-
leged.
64 See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF ToRTS, 721 (3d ed. 1964).
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least from the standpoint of potential plaintiffs. One may well question,
however, the advisability of opening the floodgates in all cases of negli-
gent rather than intentional misrepresentation.
Terry A. Bethel
